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A classic is classic not because it conforms to certain structural
rules, or fits certain definitions .... It is classic because of a certain
eternal and irrepressible freshness.
Edith Wharton
Introduction
IN 1997, THE UNITED STATES District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania decided whether Internet-based contacts alone
are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant. In
this unlikely watershed case, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn,
Inc.,' the district court wrangled with the new concept of purposeful
availment through electronic contact with a forum state. The court
viewed Zippo and its antecedents as a new body of personal jurisdiction
law: Internet-based personal jurisdiction. In Zippo, the district court
created a new test, the Zippo sliding scale, to evaluate the purposeful
availment issue when a defendant's contacts are based on Internet ac-
tivity. Many courts then followed Zippo's impulse to categorize In-
ternet-based contacts differently than other contacts and applied the
sliding scale to a variety of cases possessing the common thread of
Internet activity.2
Zippo and its progeny question the extent the law should custom-
ize doctrine addressing the practical changes created by technological
* Catherine Ross Dunham is an Associate Professor of Law at Elon University
School of Law. I would like to thank my research assistant, Heather Quinn, for her
invaluable assistance researching this Article.
1. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
2. See infta note 86 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying the Zippo test
to determine whether Internet-based contacts establish personal jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant).
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advances. Courts are now in a similar position to courts at the turn of
the twentieth century, when the country struggled with the realities of
industrialization and cross-country travel. In Pennoyer v. Neff3 and later
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,4 courts mediated the tensions
between national growth and the tradition of territoriality. Courts did
this through tests based on a defendant's contacts with the forum,
rather than a defendant's physical presence in the forum. Territorial-
ity, or place, served as the foundation of twentieth-century personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence and the use of a minimum contacts analysis
formed the analytical framework.
Tensions exist between the role of contacts based on Internet ac-
tivity and contacts based on physical location. The Zippo sliding scale
was a federal district court's response to the tension created by the
perceived amelioration of place as a determinant of contacts and pur-
poseful availment. The Zippo approach responded to a rising fear that
if entities are able to contact citizens of the forum through the In-
ternet alone, those contacts will fail the test of minimum contacts be-
cause Internet-based contacts can be disseminated so widely that
purposeful availment with any particular forum is nonexistent.
This Article argues that the district court's response in Zippo con-
stituted a premature, non-functional, and destabilizing reaction to In-
ternet-based contacts analysis. First, the Zippo sliding scale has
destabilized the foundation of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence by
directing courts to analyze the defendant's contacts in reference to a
linear scale. Second, this Article addresses how Zippo's hasty construc-
tion creates a new need to define the established framework of con-
tacts analysis based on the place theory directives of Pennoyer and
International Shoe. Finally, this Article evaluates how place theory fits in
the modern context through the hypothetical analysis of a case
wherein a defendant's only contacts with the forum are Internet
based.
I. Background
A. The Role of Place in Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
This Article refers to the visual image of a house, offered as a
metaphor for personal jurisdiction analysis. The house is not an elabo-
rate mansion, but a small frame structure built on a subterranean
stone foundation. It is a stable, functional, traditional house, common
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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to many American neighborhoods in the middle part of the twentieth
century. And, as with any structure, construction of the house began
with a foundation.
The foundation for modem personal jurisdiction analysis was laid
before the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Due Process Clause to
the states. 5 It emerged in American jurisprudence after the applica-
tion of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the adoption and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Prior to the era of indus-
trialization and the meshing of cross-country connections through a
transcontinental railroad, American dispute resolution was local. 7 In
the latter part of the nineteenth century, courts began to adjust to the
birth of a mobile American society.8 The Anglo-based procedures and
customs were nurtured in American courts where civil disputes still
relied on face-to-face resolution before a judge.9 Not until the nation
stretched from east to west did courts face the challenge of determin-
ing proper procedural due process when one party did not reside
within the forum state.
Pennoyerwas the United States Supreme Court's first response to a
more mobile society.10 In Pennoyer, the original landowner, Neff,
moved from Oregon to California, leaving behind a parcel of land
and a debt owed to his lawyer. I.4Neff's lawyer filed suit against Neff for
5. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 730-33 (examining cases decided before the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment, including: Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404
(1855) (holding the tribunal must have jurisdiction over the defendant to render a valid
judgment); Mitchell's Adm'r v. Gray, 18 Ind. 123 (1862) (same); Darrance v. Preston, 18
Iowa 396 (1865) (same); Smith v. McCutchen, 38 Mo. 415 (1866) (same); Borden v. Fitch,
15 Johns. 121 (N.Y. 1818) (holding notice must be given for a court to assert in personam
jurisdiction); and Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. 1809) (same)).
6. See generally Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448-50 (1939) (describing the his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified on July 28, 1868).
7. See Philip L. Merkel, The Origins of an Expanded Federal Court Jurisdiction: Railroad
Development and the Ascendancy of the Federal Judiciay, 58 Bus. HisT. Rxv. 336, 337 (1984).
8. See generally id. (discussing changes in American jurisprudence after the establish-
ment of the intercontinental railroad).
9. Id.
10. See David Willie, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet-Proposed Limits on State Juris-
diction over Data Communications in Tort Cases, 87 Ky. L.J. 95, 161 (1998).
11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 717 (1877). Marcus Neff hired attorney John H.
Mitchell to help him prepare paperwork for a land grant. Id. Mitchell later sued Neff in
Oregon state court for unpaid bills. Id. Neff was living in California at the time, however,
and was unaware of the proceedings. Id. Mitchell therefore won the lawsuit by default
judgment. Id. at 720. When Mitchell won the lawsuit in February 1866, Neff s land grant
had not yet been conferred. Id. Mitchell, possibly waiting for the arrival of the grant, waited
until July 1866 to get a writ of attachment on the property. Id. at 719. The court later
ordered the land seized and sold in order to pay the judgment. Id. Mitchell bought the
land at that very auction and later sold the land for approximately $15,000 and transferred
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a $300 fee bill and sought a post-judgment seizure of Neff's land in
order to satisfy the judgment. 2 Neff's land was sold to Neff's lawyer
for $300 through a sheriffs sale without notice to Neff. 3 The land was
later resold to Pennoyer. 14 When Neff returned to Oregon, he filed
suit to quiet title to his land, relying in part on a theory that he was
deprived of procedural due process when the sale was made without
notice to him.' 5
Although this case is most cited for its definitional distinctions
regarding in rem and in personam jurisdiction, a more interesting
and less explored attribute of the case is its illustration of the chang-
ing tensions in American life. Neff left the state of Oregon, thus leav-
ing his property.' 6 When his creditor filed suit on a debt owed, the
very practical question of notice and jurisdiction arose.' 7 Since tech-
nology was not as advanced as today, the creditor's best option was to
seek in rem jurisdiction over Neff predicated on his real property. The
Court made a bold statement when it failed to uphold the original
judgment against Neff, based on the plaintiffs failure to identify
Neff's property at the outset of the litigation.' 8 Of course, the error
was more than just one of timing and, as the Court held, the failure to
identify the property at the outset of the litigation deprived the defen-
dant of prejudgment notice, thus filing to provide a basis for the
court's exercise of jurisdiction over Neff, leading to an invalid judg-
ment.19 Perhaps more boldly, the Court in Pennoyer laid the founda-
tion for a territorial idea of personal jurisdiction.
The Court's decision reflects the post-Civil War climate of Pen-
noyer and the new American tension around the idea of individual
the tide to Sylvester Pennoyer. Id. In 1874, Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court to recover
his land. Id. The trial court held in favor of Neff and Pennoyer appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. RcHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 52 (Aspen
Publishers 2006) (1953).
12. FREER, supra note 11, at 50-51.
13. Id. at 51.
14. Id. at 52.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 58.
17. Id. at 50.
18. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 714, 721-22 (1877); see also id. at 722 ("[E]very
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory."); FREER, supra note 11, at 55 ("[A] state has power over people and things inside
its boundaries. Such power is demonstrated by the fact that the courts of the state can seize
people and property found within the state. Thus, California has power over people and
things inside California, and Oregon cannot exercise authority over such people or
things.").
19. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 725.
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states and territoriality.20 Before Pennoyer, territoriality ruled the civil
process.21 In Pennoyer, the Court wrestled with that tension and ulti-
mately incorporated the traditions of territoriality into a modern era
of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.22 Pennoyer mediated the ten-
sion by upholding the value of territoriality. It did this by affirming
quasi in rem jurisdiction as a proper jurisdictional predicate for a
valid judgment, while requiring the plaintiff to notify the defendant at
the outset of the litigation, that the land will serve as the jurisdictional
basis of the suit.23
The Court's value of territoriality forms the foundation of mod-
ern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Despite the emerging ten-
sions of growth, the Court required some contact with the territory as
a basis for personal jurisdiction. 24 Thus, Pennoyer set the stone founda-
tion of the metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction. Despite grow-
ing mobility, the defendant's "place" would be a factor in determining
the Court's authority over that person.
The structure of the metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction
was built in the middle of the twentieth century, framed with the new
"minimum contacts" test. 25 In 1942, the Supreme Court analyzed per-
sonal jurisdiction involving the most mobile of the new Americans:
the traveling salesman. In International Shoe, the Court evaluated the
power that state courts in Washington held over a company that
reached the forum state only through its salespeople. 26 The Interna-
20. See generally Merkel, supra note 7 (noting that in the years after the Civil War,
lawsuits were often removed from hostile state courts to more sympathetic federal courts,
due in large part to the mobility offered by the transcontinental railroad).
21. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723 (citing several cases that hold that a defendant is subject
to the forum's jurisdiction if the person is found within thatjurisdiction, including: Penn v.
Lord Baltimore, (1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 444; Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810);
Watkins v. Holman, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 25 (1842); Corbett v. Nutt, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 464
(1870)).
22. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 721-22; see also FREER, supra note 11, at 54-55.
23. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 721-26; id. at 725-26 ("'If there is no appearance of the defen-
dant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes in its essential nature a proceed-
ing in rem, the only effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the
demand which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. That such is the nature of this
proceeding.'" (quoting Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870)).
24. Id. at 721-22.
25. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. Id. at 310. The plaintiff, responsible for filing suit in Washington, established a
"tax" on employers doing business therein, comprised of a mandatory contribution to the
state's Unemployment Compensation Fund. Id. at 311-12. The defendant, International
Shoe, was a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Mis-
souri. Id. at 313. The corporation had maintained for some time a staff of eleven to thir-
teen salesmen in Washington who were residents of that state, and who occasionally rented
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tional Shoe Company ("International Shoe") manufactured shoes in
St. Louis, Missouri, but employed Washington residents as salesper-
sons.27 Although International Shoe did not own any land in Washing-
ton, it occasionally rented rooms for the purpose of displaying
shoes.28 Salespeople had no authority to accept purchase offers;
rather, they forwarded the offers to buy shoes to St. Louis, where all
decisions were made.29 Although the defendant company sold shoes
in Washington through its salespeople-it had no real presence in the
forum state. 30 The State argued that International Shoe should be
subject to personal jurisdiction within the forum state because it sold
its product in the state and thus enjoyed the benefits and protections
of Washington state law. 3 ' The Court responded to this basic question
of presence and personal jurisdiction by creating the "minimum con-
tacts" test-the modem standard for personal jurisdiction analysis. 32
In its infancy, the test instructed that if a defendant had "minimum
contacts" with the forum state such that he availed himself of the ben-
space to put up displays, as well as met with prospective customers in motels and hotels,
thus having no permanent "situs" of business in the state. Id. at 313-14. International Shoe
did not pay the tax, so the state effected service of process on one of its salesmen with a
notice of assessment. Id. at 312. Washington also sent a letter by registered mail to Interna-
tional Shoe's place of business in Missouri. Id. International Shoe made a special appear-
ance in the trial court to dispute Washington's jurisdiction over it as a corporate "person."
Id. Becuase both the trial court and the Washington Supreme Court upheld personal juris-
diction, International Shoe appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 313-15.
27. Id. at 313.
28. Id. at 313-14. International Shoe paid commission to its salesmen. Id. at 320. Ad-
ditionally, Internaltional Shoe permitted its salesmen to show only one shoe of a pair so
that the company could later argue that its failure to ship an entire pair meant that it was
not really doing business in Washington. Id.
29. Id. at 314. International Shoe argued that by structuring its business in this man-
ner, the company was not subject to jurisdiction in Washington. Id. Additionally, the shoes
were shipped from St. Louis "f.o.b.," or "free on board," which required the purchaser to
pay the freight charges to get the shoes from St. Louis. Id. International Shoe thus argued
it did not ship anything into Washington and again reasoned that it should not be subject
to jurisdiction there. Id. at 314-15.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 320 ("[Tlhe activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of Wash-
ington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout
the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the course
of which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including
the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is
here sued upon arose out of those very activities.").
32. Id. For cases demonstrating the continuing nature of the test, see Asahi Metal In-
dus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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efits and protections of the forum state's laws, he would be subject to
personal jurisdiction in the forum state. 33
Through the years, the structure has been refined and updated
with more detailed interpretations of the test, including the develop-
ment of sub-tests for purposeful availment through contracting and
placing products into the stream of commerce. 34 Throughout these
refinements, however, the Court has relied on the same basic concept
held dear in Pennoyer-territoriality.3 5 The very essence of the mini-
mum contacts test is an evaluation of the defendant's physical contacts
within the forum state. The analysis typically turns on the quality and
nature of these contacts demonstrated through sale revenues from
products sold in the state; points of destination for products shipped
into the state; faxes, electronic mail, and telephone calls placed to
individuals within the forum state; and other fact-based mechanisms
for assessing the defendant's contact with the forum.36 Although mod-
em life has afforded more opportunities for individuals to contact the
forum state without physical presence in the state, the test still relies
on the physical notion of contact. Thus, the minimum contacts analy-
sis is rooted in the notion of "place," just as the court's analysis was in
Pennoyer. The metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction is framed
upon a longstanding theory of territoriality, a place-based theory of
personal jurisdiction.
B. Tensions Created by Internet-Based Contacts
An increasingly digital world has challenged the importance of
place in civil procedure analysis. When national businesses began to
33. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315.
34. See, e.g., Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 112 (holding that the petitioner's intentional act
of placing its product into the stream of commerce, coupled with its awareness that some
of the products would eventually reach the forum state, was insufficient to supportjurisdic-
tion); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79 (holding that an individual's contract with an out of
state party alone cannot automatically establish minimum contacts with the forum, and
that the parties' actual course of dealing must be evaluated to determine whether a defen-
dant purposefully established minimum contacts); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774-75 (holding that
the forum has jurisdiction if the defendant has "purposefully directed" his activities at re-
sidents of the forum); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (holding that the forum
state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdic-
tion over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that its products will be purchased by consumers in the forum state, and these
products subsequently injure forum consumers).
35. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
36. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 481; Silver Ring Splint Co. v. Digisplint, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 2d 508, 513 (W.D. Va. 2007); Taltwell, LLC v. Zonet USA Corp., No. 3:07cv543, 2007
WL 4562874, at *18-19 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2007).
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use the Internet as a basis for commerce in the 1990s, the house of
personal jurisdiction began to feel crowded. With the minimum con-
tacts frame bursting at the seams, courts began to plan-and ulti-
mately build-an addition onto the metaphorical house to
accommodate digital commerce. Unfortunately, the addition was built
without adequate consideration of the underlying structure and integ-
rity of the framing, leaving a functionless add-on that threatens the
foundational integrity of the entire house.
The renovation planning began in 1996 when federal courts ad-
dressed the role of the Internet in three trademark infringement
cases.3 7 In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,38 a New York restaurateur
brought a trademark infringement suit against the operator of an In-
ternet website which shared the restaurant's famous name.3 9 The
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, noting the website operator did not use the Internet to
reach out to the forum state, New York. 40 Instead, the site derived
revenue from substantially local sources, rather than sources from
New York or other national sources. 41 In addition to defining "site"4 2
and "Internet,"43 the court in Bensusan held that Internet activity can
37. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Bensusan Rest. Corp.
v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Mo. 1996).
38. 937 F. Supp. 295.
39. See id. at 297, 300. The plaintiffs New York club and the defendant's Internet site
both had the name "The Blue Note." Id. at 297. The defendant's site advertised a nightclub
in Columbia, Missouri, that serves Columbia residents almost exclusively, most of whom
are University of Missouri students. Id. at 300. The Internet site included information
about the club, an events calendar, and ticketing information, including the names and
contact information of ticket outlets in Columbia and a charge-by-phone telephone num-
ber through which tickets could be ordered and picked up at the club. Id. at 297.
40. Id. at 301. In distinguishing this case from an almost simultaneous decision from
the Sixth Circuit in CompuServe, the court found that the facts of Bensusan did not demon-
strate that the had defendant "reached out" from Missouri to New York. Id. The court held
that "[t]his action ... contains no allegations that King in any way directed any contact to,
or had any contact with, NewYork or intended to avail itself of any of NewYork's benefits."
Id.
41. See id. at 300. The court noted that no goods were shipped from Missouri to New
York, and that the defendant did not earn any revenues from New York residents. Id.
42. Id. at 297 n.1 ("A 'site' is an Internet address which permits users to exchange
digital information with a particular host[,] . . . and the World Wide Web refers to the
collection of sites available on the Internet." (citing Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
43. Id. ("The Internet is the world's largest computer network (a network consisting
of two or more computers linked together to share electronic mail and files). The Internet
is actually a network of thousands of independent networks, containing several million
'host' computers that provide information services. An estimated 25 million individuals
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have a passive or active character. 44
The same year Bensusan was decided, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the question of minimum contacts through the In-
ternet in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson.45 In CompuServe, plaintiff Com-
puServe filed a declaratory judgment action in the federal district
court in Ohio against the defendant, a CompuServe subscriber, to set-
tle defendant's allegations that CompuServe had infringed on defen-
dant's software trademarks. 46 The district court dismissed the action,
finding that the defendant had not purposefully availed himself of the
benefits and privileges of Ohio law. 47 The plaintiff appealed, arguing,
inter alia, that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of Ohio
law when it entered into a contract with the plaintiff for the sale and
marketing of "shareware" to CompuServe subscribers. 48 The Sixth Cir-
cuit agreed with CompuServe, noting that Patterson purposefully con-
tracted to market his product nationally, knowing CompuServe's Ohio
operations would serve as his distribution center.49 The Sixth Circuit
stated the case was a "novel question of first impression" regarding the
sufficiency of electronic contacts under the Due Process Clause analy-
sis of personal jurisdiction. 50 However, the court performed a contact-
have some form of Internet access, and this audience is doubling each year." (citing MTV
Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994))).
44. Id. at 300. The court used the existing tenet of foreseeability to delineate between
the passive and active nature of Internet sites. Id. at 300 ("[M]ere foreseeability of an in-
state consequence and a failure to avert that consequence is not sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction.").
45. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
46. Id. at 1261. CompuServe addressed the business relationship between defendant
Patterson, a Texas domiciliary, and plaintiff CompuServe, an Ohio corporation that pro-
vided subscribers access to more than 1700 information services on the Internet. Id. at
1259-60. The defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff
would market and sell the defendant's electronic programs, referred to as "shareware," to
other subscribers. Id. at 1260. The defendant claimed the plaintiff had stolen the design of
his shareware products and marketed them under the CompuServe name. Id. at 1261.
When the parties could not resolve the dispute, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment
action. Id. The defendant then moved the court to dismiss the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction in Ohio. Id. The district court dismissed the case and the plaintiff appealed. Id.
47. Id. at 1264. The district court held that the electronic links between defendant
Patterson, who is a Texan, and Ohio, where CompuServe is headquartered, were "too tenu-
ous to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction." Id. at 1260 (internal citation omitted).
The district court also denied CompuServe's motion for reconsideration. Id.
48. Id. at 1263.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1262. The court considered whether "CompuServe [made] a prima facie
showing that Patterson's contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in
nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process Clause, to support the district court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction over him." Id.
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based jurisdiction inquiry in its decision. 51 Despite grand allusions to
the Internet as "the latest and greatest manifestation of these histori-
cal, globe-shrinking trends,"52 the court relied on the imbedded con-
cept of foreseeability, holding that the defendant was subject to
personal jurisdiction in Ohio.53 Thus, despite the defendant's lack of
any other contact with the forum state, the act of reaching out to
Ohio electronically, satisfied due process requirements. 54
The third case in the trilogy of trademark infringement cases
leading to the addition on the personal jurisdiction house, Maritz, Inc.
v. Cybergold, Inc.,55 also held that the defendant was subject to the fo-
rum state's jurisdiction using traditional minimum contacts analysis. 56
However, the district court in Maritz identified the personal jurisdic-
tion question as an issue of first impression. 57 The court labeled the
51. Id. at 1266. The CompuServe court asserted that a defendant does not have to be
physically present in the forum state to satisfy the requirements of purposeful availment.
Id. at 1264. The court stated that "[s]o long as a commercial actor's efforts are 'purpose-
fully directed' toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion
that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there." Id. at 1264
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463 (1985)). The CompuServe court
further reasoned that the defendant
consciously reached out from Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, and to
use its service to market his computer software on the Internet. He entered into a
contract which expressly stated that it would be governed by and construed in
light of Ohio law. Ohio has written and interpreted its long-arm statute, and par-
ticularly its "transacting business" subsection, with the intent of reaching as far as
the Due Process Clause will allow, and it certainly has an interest "in providing
effective means of redress for its residents.
Id. at 1266 (citing McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). Continued the
court: "As the Burger King [ ] Court noted, the purposeful direction of one's activities to-
ward a state has always been significant in personal jurisdiction cases, particularly where
individuals purposefully derive benefits from interstate activities." Id. (citing Burger King,
471 U.S. at 472-73).
52. Id. at 1262 ("The Internet represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation
of these historical, globe-shrinking trends. It enables anyone with the right equipment and
knowledge-that is, people like Patterson-to operate an international business cheaply,
and from a desktop. That business operator, however, remains entitled to the protection of
the Due Process Clause, which mandates that potential defendants be able 'to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where the conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit.' . . . Thus, this case presents a situation where we must
reconsider the scope of our jurisdictional reach." (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))).
53. Id. at 1265 ("Patterson deliberately set in motion an ongoing marketing relation-
ship with CompuServe, and he should have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have
consequences in Ohio.").
54. See id. at 1266.
55. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
56. Id. at 1332-34.
57. Id. at 1332. The court framed the issue as
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Internet as an entirely new means of information exchange and found
analogies to cases involving mail and telephone contacts inapposite
based on the ability of electronic mail to efficiently reach a global au-
dience.58 The subtext of the district court's opinion is a reticence to
accept the advent of electronic communication and an unspoken fear
of this new medium of commercial communication. 59 Despite this ret-
icence, the court set out and followed the Eighth Circuit's five-prong
test for measuring minimum contacts, focusing its analysis on the na-
ture and quality of the defendant's contacts with the forum state. 60
Two points follow from the district court's decision in Maritz.
First, the court concluded that the nature and quality of contacts pro-
vided by the maintenance of a website on the Internet are of a differ-
ent nature and quality than other means of contact with the forum
state. 61 This conclusion follows from the court's limited understand-
ing of electronic mail and Internet use, rather than from the actual
facts of the case and the actions of the defendant. The court viewed
the website's ability to respond to each and every person who accessed
the site as evidence of the defendant's intent to reach all Internet
users. The court held this established purposeful availment and suffi-
cient contacts to subject the defendant to the forum's jurisdiction. 62
Second, the case introduces the concept of a passive website but rea-
[w]hether maintaining a website, such as the one maintained by CyberGold,
which can be accessed by any [I]nternet user, and which appears to be main-
tained for the purpose of, and in anticipation of, being accessed and used by any
and all [I]nternet users, including those residing in Missouri, amounts to promo-
tional activities or active solicitations such as to provide the minimum contacts
necessary for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation,
presents an issue of first impression to this Court.
Id. The Maritz court highlights the new and mysterious character of the Internet and elec-
tronic communication and suggests the Internet raises new questions of due process.
58. Id. at 1332-33 (noting that electronic mail differs from posted mail in its effi-
ciency and reach, and that electronic mail places advertisers in immediate contact with
potential clients, whereas 1-800 numbers require advertisers to market the number and
wait for interested persons to call); see also Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F.
Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).
59. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330. The court defines the terms "Internet" and "informa-
tion superhighway," using CyberGold's web service as an example of the Internet's ability
to interconnect computers to each other. Id.
60. Id. at 1332. The Eighth Circuit's five-part test balances (1) the nature of the con-
tacts with the forum state; (2) the quality of the contacts; (3) the relationship between the
contacts and the cause of action; (4) the interest of the forum state; and (5) the conve-
nience of the parties. Id.
61. Id. at 1333.
62. Id.
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sons that this distinction is irrelevant because any website on the In-
ternet demonstrates an intent to reach all Internet users.63
C. The District Court's Remedy in Zippo
The infant jurisprudence birthed in 1996 cried out for more
space in the house of personal jurisdiction. In January 1997, the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania renovated the
house of personal jurisdiction when it decided Zippo. In Zippo, the
court added a new sliding scale to be used in evaluating minimum
contacts based on Internet activity.64
Zippo arose from a trademark infringement action brought under
the Lanham Act 65 by Zippo Manufacturing Company ("Zippo Manu-
facturing"), the Pennsylvania manufacturer of Zippo tobacco light-
ers.66 Zippo Manufacturing complained that Zippo Dot Com, a
California-based Internet news service, infringed on the Zippo trade-
mark by use of domain names, including the name "Zippo."67 Defen-
dant Zippo Dot Coin moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. 68 Zippo Manufacturing countered that
because Zippo Dot Com's website was accessible to Pennsylvania re-
sidents, and since Pennsylvania residents were subscribers of Zippo
Dot Coin's news service through the Internet site,69 Zippo Dot Coin
63. Id. CyberGold introduced the concept of passive websites by characterizing its
website as passive. The Maritz court disagreed with CyberGold's reasoning:
CyberGold's posting of information about its new, up-coming [sic] service
through a website seeks to develop a mailing list of [I]nternet users, as such users
are essential to the success of its service. Clearly, CyberGold has obtained the
website for the purpose of, and in anticipation that, [I]nternet users, searching
the Internet for websites, will access CyberGold's website and eventually sign up
on CyberGold's mailing list. Although CyberGold characterizes its activity as
merely maintaining a "passive website," its intent is to reach all [I]nternet users,
regardless of geographic location.
Id.
64. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
65. See id. at 1121; see also Federal Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-127 (2000).
66. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1119; see also, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
67. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121-22. Zippo Dot Com obtained the exclusive right to use
the domain names "zippo.com," "zippo.net," and "zipponews.com." Id. at 1121. Zippo Dot
Coin operated a website that contained information about the company, advertisements,
and an application to become a subscriber to the news service. Id. Through the use of the
word "Zippo" in the domain name, activity on the site generates the use of the word
"Zippo" in numerous locations on the company's website and in many downloads and
messages sent from and posted on the website. Id. at 1121-22.
68. Id. at 1121.
69. Id. All of Zippo Dot Coin's contacts with Pennsylvania occurred over the Internet,
through a website that was nationally accessible. Id. Zippo Dot Com had approximately
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had sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania to allow the dis-
trict court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Zippo Dot
Com. 70
The Zippo court's analysis began at the "Constitutional touch-
stone" of minimum contacts, recognizing the role of foreseeability
and "reaching out" in the determination of purposeful availment. 71
Then, relying specifically on the 1996 trilogy of trademark infringe-
ment cases, 72 the court devised a sliding scale to evaluate the nature
and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet.73
Figure 1.74
No Personal Jurisdiction Possible Personal Jurisdiction Proper Personal Jisdiction
Defendant has simply Defendant partcipates Defendant clearly does
posted information on in an interactive business over the
an Internet website website where a user Internet involving
which is accessible to can exchange knowing and repeated
users in foreign information with the transmission of
jurisdictions. A host computer. Here, computer files over
passive webute with the exercise of the Internet; personal
the goal to make jurisdiction is jurisdiction is proper.
information available determined by (Copunw- Inc. r.
to those interested is examining the level of Patr'ron, 89 F3d
not grounds for the iateractivity and the 1257 (6 Cit. 1996))
exercise of personal commercial nature of
jursdtion. the exchange of
(Bsmtaoon Rrtaurnpt information that
Corp. v. King, 937 F. occurs on the website.
Supp. 295 (SJD.N.Y. (Maritc, Inc. v.
1996)). Cbagold, Inc. 947
F Supp. 1328
(E.D.Mo. 1996))
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn Sliding Scale
140,000 subscribers worldwide, and approximately two percent of the subscribers (or 3,000
people) were Pennsylvania residents. Id. In addition, Zippo Dot Com had entered into
seven agreements with Internet service providers in Pennsylvania. Id.
70. Id. at 1122-27. The court held that Zippo Dot Corn would not be subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, thus narrowing its inquiry to whether the defendant had
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, whether the claim asserted arose out of the
defendant's contacts, and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
was reasonable. Id. at 1125-27.
71. Id. at 1123 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
72. Id. at 1124-25; see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D.
Cal. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
73. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24. The court used a sliding scale to differentiate
between activity on websites. Id.
74. This graphic is a visual interpretation of the court's textual description of the
scale.
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The sliding scale demonstrates the spectrum of a defendant's
business activity on the Internet. 75 On one end of the scale, the court
described situations where businesses clearly conduct business on the
Internet such as contracting with foreign residents76 and using the
Internet for repeated and knowing transmission of computer files.
77
The court held that defendants falling at this end of the scale are
subject to personal jurisdiction.78 At the opposite end of the scale, the
court described passive websites that provide information only to In-
ternet users and are not sufficient to subject the defendant to per-
sonal jurisdiction.79 The court then discussed the "middle ground" of
Internet activity, a space occupied by interactive sites wherein the user
and host computer can exchange information. This type of website
requires the court to examine the nature of activity on the individual
site to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
proper.80
The sliding scale confirms the outcome of minimum contacts
analysis on Internet-based activity that is either predominantly passive
or overwhelmingly active/interactive. As in prior cases of mail or tele-
phone communication between remote parties, the level and nature
of the activity controls the jurisdictional analysis.81 If a defendant uses
the Internet to attract foreign customers, and continues to deal with
the out-of-state entity (through the Internet or otherwise), the tradi-
tional basis for personal jurisdiction is formed. Likewise, if the defen-
dant does nothing more than make information available to the
general public-through the Internet or through traditional advertis-
ing-the test for personal jurisdiction is likely not met because the
activity does not demonstrate purposeful availment. The passive and
active ends of the Zippo sliding scale contribute nothing to the estab-
lished understanding of minimum contacts and purposeful availment.
It is the vast midsection of the scale, the websites which are neither
completely active, nor completely passive, that present difficult
questions.
75. Id. at 1124.
76. The term "foreign" in a court's personal jurisdiction analysis typically refers
broadly to persons or entities residing outside of the jurisdiction. BLACK'S LAw DIC-rIONARY
675 (8th ed. 2004).
77. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. Supp. 1257
(6th Cir. 1996)).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
80. Id. (citing Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
81. See CompuServe, 89 F. Supp. at 1263, 1265 (using the level and nature of the activity
as consideration in an Internet-based activity case).
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II. Post-Zippo Destabilization
The Zippo court reasoned that its scale was a new approach to
personal jurisdiction analysis developed to intercept the "global
revolution looming on the horizon," thus staging its own opinion as
the next step in a progression of personal jurisdiction law.8 2 However,
the Zippo court's creation and application of the scale fails to offer any
new approach to personal jurisdiction analysis. In fact, the scale itself
has led to more confusion as courts try to comprehensively wedge In-
ternet-based contacts questions into the inadequate and poorly struc-
tured scale, essentially overbuilding and overcrowding the addition to
the house of personal jurisdiction.
A. The Structural Stress of Zippo's Progeny
The renovated house of personal jurisdiction has become an at-
tractive gathering place for courts and litigants wrestling with motions
to dismiss predicated on Internet-based contacts. 83 Despite the fact
that the Zippo sliding scale is the creation of a federal district court,
other courts have used the test to determine whether a website sub-
jected a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum state. 84 Al-
though reference to the scale has continued through the present,
some circuits have been reluctant to affirmatively adopt the scale. 85
82. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123 ("'[A]s technological progress has increased the flow
of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction has undergone a similar increase.'"
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 205-51 (1958))); see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (finding that physical presence in the forum is not
required for the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
83. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 709 (4th Cir.
2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1999); Roberts v. Paulin, No.
07-CV-13207, 2007 WL 3203969, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2007); Premedics v. Zoll, No.
3:06-0716, 2007 WL 3012968, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 9, 2007).
84. See, e.g., Roberts, 2007 WL 3203969, at *5. The court evaluated the question of
personal jurisdiction regarding a California company that advertised its product through a
website accessible to Michigan residents, but that did not use Michigan vendors. Id. at
*1-5.
85. See Toys R Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knowingly transacted business with the forum
state by "directly targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of
the forum state via its web site, or through sufficiently other related contacts"); Noegen
Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
presence of a website that is "interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended inter-
action with residents of the state" is sufficient to show purposeful availment); Panavision
Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring "something
more" than a passive website with advertising and contact information to indicate the de-
fendant purposefully directed activity at the forum state, and holding that satisfaction of
the effects test is sufficient); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir.
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Other circuits have been less reticent.86
The Fourth Circuit recognized that the Internet-based contacts
question invoked an existing dichotomy between the traditional mini-
mum contacts analysis and the Calder v. Jones87 effects test when ap-
plied in intentional tort cases.88 When a plaintiff alleges an
intentional tort via use of a website, the two tests coalesce around the
nexus of the Internet activity. For example, in ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital
Service Consultants,89 the plaintiffs alleged that a Georgia-based In-
ternet service provider who enabled a website owner to publish photo-
graphs on the Internet subjected itself to personal jurisdiction in
Maryland. 90 The plaintiffs argued that this move allowed arguments
from the traditional contacts perspective and the effects test perspec-
tive. 91 Given that the contact arguments centered on Internet activity,
the circuit court adopted the Zippo sliding scale, while creating a new
test which essentially imports the Zippo scale into a Calder-like effects
test.92 The new test allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person outside of the forum when that person: (1) directs elec-
tronic activity into the state; (2) with the manifested intent of engag-
1997); Ginsburg v. Dinicola, No. 06-11509-RWZ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41418, at *1, *7 fn.1
(D. Mass. June 7, 2007) (noting that the First Circuit has neither elaborated nor adopted
the scale); Baker v. Carnival Corp., No. 06-21527, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85114, at *12-13
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2006) (failing to apply the Zippo test and noting that district courts in
the Eleventh Circuit have based personal jurisdiction over the defendant on the defen-
dant's continuous and systematic contacts); Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 05-C-
6561, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13782, at "1, *16-18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2006) (weighing the
presence of the website, and placing significant emphasis on the website's interactive na-
ture); GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 1998)
(discussing the Zippo scale).
86. See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007) (using the
Zippo scale not as a separate analytical framework, but as a tool to decide whether a defen-
dant has transacted business in the forum); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants,
293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Zippo scale, but creating a test for personal
jurisdiction that combines the Zippo scale and the test used in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984)). Under the test created in ALS Scan, a court may find personal jurisdiction when
the defendant directs electronic activity into the state with the manifested intent of engag-
ing in business or other interactions within the state. Id. The activity must additionally
create a potential cause of action in the state. Id.; see also Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348
F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that the Zippo scale is properly used in cases where
specific jurisdiction is alleged, but that the scale alone is insufficient when general jurisdic-
tion is alleged); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) ("We find that
the reasoning of Zippo is persuasive and adopt it in this Circuit.").
87. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
88. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d 707.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 709.
91. Id. at 712.
92. Id. at 714.
[Vol. 43
THE INTERNET AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
ing in business or other interactions within the forum; and (3) that
activity creates, in a person within the forum, a potential cause of ac-
tion cognizable under the laws of the forum.93 The test devised by the
Fourth Circuit substitutes an intent analysis for the Zippo scale's deter-
mination of website activity which is neither completely active nor
completely passive.9 4 As applied, the test places websites used to inten-
tionally direct electronic commercial activity into the forum into the
interactive arm of the scale. 95
Arguably, however, the Fourth Circuit's professed adoption of the
Zippo scale adds nothing to the middle portion of the scale since activ-
ity and intent measure the same element of the defendant's conduct:
purposefully engaging itself in the forum.
By crafting the Zippo sliding scale into a test relying on commer-
cial traffic, the Fifth Circuit also crowded into the new room in the
house of personal jurisdiction.9 6 In Mink v. AAAA Development, LLC,9 v
the defendant company did not take purchase orders through their
website, and thus no interactive commercial activity could be con-
93. Id. ("Thus, adopting and adapting the Zippo model, we conclude that a State may,
consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State
when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested
intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity
creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's
courts. Under this standard, a person who simply places information on the Internet does
not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic signal is transmit-
ted and received. Such passive Internet activity does not generally include directing elec-
tronic activity into the State with the manifested intent of engaging business or other
interactions in the State thus creating in a person within the State a potential cause of
action cognizable in courts located in the State."); see also Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. Under
Calder, personal jurisdiction can be based on (1) intentional actions, (2) expressly aimed at
the forum state, and (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-and which the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state. Id. at 789-90.
94. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714-15.
95. See id. at 714; see also Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP, 518 F. Supp. 2d
688, 695 n.6 (D. S.C. 2007). In Motley Rice, a South Carolina law firm sued a Texas law firm
alleging breach of co-counsel and fee sharing agreements and seeking to clarify, reform, or
rescind such agreements. Id. at 689. Following the case's removal on diversity grounds, the
Texas law firm moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to
transfer the case to United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Id. at 691.
The court noted: "ALS Scan provides some support to Plaintiffs' argument that the court
has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiffs and Defendant communicated with
each other during their nineteen year relationship in which they served as co-counsel, and
Plaintiffs now have a potential cause of action against Defendant for breach of contract."
Id. at 695.
96. See Mink v. AAAA Dev., LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) ("We find the
reasoning of Zippo is persuasive and adopt it in this Circuit.").
97. Id.
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ducted through the site.98 The website at issue was essentially a bulle-
tin board that posted information about the defendant's products. 99
By employing the scale to resolve the personal jurisdiction question,
the Fifth Circuit created its own version of Zippo, holding that if the
website in question allows visitors to purchase products and services
online, the court will exercise personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. 100 However, the court's analysis did not require the use of the
scale. A simple factual analysis of purposeful availment would have
rendered the same result.101
Implementation of the Zippo sliding scale has led to a confusing
array of decisions, demonstrating the scale's faults. In addition, courts
and litigants seem to overlook contacts analysis when confronted with
an Internet-based business or communication between the parties
through electronic mail.102 Courts have used the Zippo scale in cases
where the issue of personal jurisdiction centers on product sales be-
98. Id. at 336-37. Mink was a Texas resident and furniture salesman. Id. at 334. He
claimed that in January 1997, he began to develop a computer program designed to track
information on sales made and opportunities missed on sales not made. Id. On May 13,
1997, Mink applied for a patent. Id. Mink claimed that he was approached by Stark, a
Colorado resident, in June 1997, and that he eventually shared information with Stark
about his computer program. Id. at 335. Between June 1997 and October 1997, Stark alleg-
edly shared all of Mink's ideas and information about the program with Middlebrook, a
Vermont resident. Id. "According to Mink's complaint, Middlebrook and two companies,
AAAA Development and Profitsystems, conspired to copy Mink's copyrighted and patent-
pending [program] and create an identical system of their own for financial gain." Id.
AAAA Development was a Vermont corporation with its principal place of business in Ver-
mont. Id. "Neither AAAA Development nor Middlebrook own [ed] property in Texas." Id.
AAAA Development had advertised in a national furniture trade journal and through a
website on the Internet. Id.
99. Id. at 336-37.
100. Id. at 337 ("AAAA's website does not allow consumers to order or purchase prod-
ucts and services online."); see also Roberts v. Paulin, No. 07-CV-13207, 2007 WL 3203969,
at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2007) (noting that the defendant sold less than $500 worth of
products in the forum); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2007 WL 3046216, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (holding that a website that allows visitors to access information
about canine pedigrees is not interactive because it does not offer communication about
products and services).
101. See Mink, 190 F.3d at 337; see also Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
102. See Dearwater v. Bond Mfg. Co., No. 1:06-CV-154, 2007 WL 2745321 (D. Vt. Sept.
19, 2007). Plaintiff Dearwater brought a wrongful termination lawsuit against defendant
employer Bond Manufacturing. Id. at *1. The plaintiff acquired the job through e-mails in
response to advertisements on Craigslist and CareerBuilder.com. Id. Defendant Bond had
no connection to the forum state, and the plaintiff's only basis for asserting personal juris-
diction was the defendant's advertisements on national websites. Id. The plaintiff argued
that the Zippo scale should apply, using the job search sites (which are at the most active
end of the Zippo scale) as a basis to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at
*7.
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tween states. Courts have also invoked Zippo when the company had a
website which either advertised or sold products, despite other evi-
dence of contact between the defendant and the forum state. 103 In the
product cases, courts rely on the amount of revenue from product
sales to determine the issue of presence in the forum. 10 4 A product
site which fails to generate substantial revenue is not deemed an inter-
active site when set upon the sliding scale.' 0 5 Furthermore, litigants
typically request for the scale's application when the defendant's site
is not commercial in nature.10 6 After a court applies the Zippo scale, a
website lacking commercial Internet activity is typically held to be a
passive website without consideration of the defendant's purposeful
availment of the forum state. 107
B. The House Destabilized
Rather than enhance the house of personal jurisdiction, the scale
directs courts and parties to an area of the house unsupported by the
original place-based structure. Thus, the Zippo renovations have desta-
bilized the house of personal jurisdiction. Courts relied on the new-
103. See, e.g., George Kessel Int'l, Inc. v. Classic Wholesales, Inc., No. CV-07-323-
PHXSMM, 2007 WL 3208297, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 30, 2007) (holding that the defendant's
website was "passive," and ignoring other communications between the parties that poten-
tially establish purposeful availment); Roberts v. Paulin, No. 07-CV-13207, 2007 WL
3203969, at *4-6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2007) (applying the Zippo scale and basing personal
jurisdiction over the defendant on the amount of commercial revenues from the forum,
despite the defendant's lack of commercial contact with the forum).
104. See, e.g., Roberts, 2007 WL 3203969; Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04-C-3317, 2007 WL
3046216 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007).
105. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Development, LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that a website that essentially only advertises and provides order forms is con-
sidered a "passive" or non-interactive site on the Zippo scale).
106. See Vax-D Medical Tech., LLC v. Allied Health Mgmt., LTD, No. 8:04-CV-1617-T-
26TGW, 2006 WL 4847740, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2006). The defendant's website in
Vax-D purported to advertise chiropractors using the VAX-D technique. In reality, those
chiropractors used a different technique. Id. at *2; see also Chi. Architecture Found. v.
Domain Magic, LLC, No. 07 C 764, 2007 WL 3046124, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2007). In
Chicago Architecture, the defendant created a website portal designed to pirate the plaintiffs
website hits. Id. at *5. The court placed the defendant's website on the Zippo scale despite
the absence of any commercial traffic between the plaintiff and defendant. Id.
107. See Zombeck Co. v. Amada, No. 06-953, 2007 WL 4105231 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 15,
2007). In a products liability case against a foreign component part manufacturer, the
plaintiff combined a stream of commerce analysis with a Zippo analysis. Id. at *3-5. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant's website alone, which allowed electronic mail content,
even in the absence of additional contact with the forum state, subjected the defendant to
personal jurisdiction in the forum state. Id. at *4-5.
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ness of Internet activity in formulating the original scale. 0 8 The
Internet was described in terms of its ephemeral existence online. De-
vices now as commonplace as electronic mail were differentiated from
posted mail and telephone calls because of electronic mail's remote-
ness and inability to place persons in live contact with another.1° 9
Thus, the Zippo scale was predicated on the concept of non-contact
rather than on the longstanding concepts of minimum contacts and
purposeful availment. The early decisions identified the issue of In-
ternet-based contacts as matters of first impression, distinct from the
traditional personal jurisdiction case. 110 By doing so, courts have
turned away from traditional place-based analysis and attempted to
create a new arm of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence for Internet-
based contacts.
This new analysis is not based on the traditional tenets of territo-
riality and contacts. Given the historical importance of territory and
contact, a new, individual analysis for Internet-based contacts is inade-
quate. The new approach's lack of architectural support is demon-
strated through the post-Zippo decisions.'' A court may at times
invoke the scale as a means to describe the Internet basis for the juris-
dictional argument.112 The decisions often revert to more traditional
contacts analysis, relying on the secure ground of revenues, contracts,
and communication, despite sometimes lengthy discussions of the pas-
sivity or interactivity of the website.1 13
IH. Applying the Place Theory Framework in Internet-Based
Contacts Analysis
Place theory is the theory of personal jurisdiction enhanced by
Pennoyer and International Shoe.11 4 The core of place theory is the un-
108. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1996); see aLso
Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v.
CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330-32 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
109. For a discussion of the differences between electronic mail, telephone advertise-
ments, and traditional mail, see the sources cited supra note 58 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of these early cases, see the sources cited supra notes 57-58, and
the text accompanying notes 50, 52, and 58.
111. See, e.g., Premedics, Inc. v. Zoll Med. Corp., .No. 3:06-0716, 2007 WL 3012968
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 9, 2007).
112. See, e.g., Word Music, LLC v. Priddis Music, Inc., No. 3:070502, 2007 WL 3231835,
at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 30 2007).
113. See, e.g., Chi. Architecture Found. v. Domain Magic, LLC, No. 07-C-764, 2007 WL
3046124 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2007).
114. For a discussion of a court's jurisdiction based on the defendant's physical loca-
tion or "place," see discission supra notes 18 and 31 and accompanying text.
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derstanding that for a defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction
within the forum, the defendant must have some contact with the ter-
ritory of the forum.115 Traditionally, contacts were viewed as variations
of physical contact, such as actual physical presence through travel,
sales, corporate operations, or telephone/facsimile/mail correspon-
dence. The core value in a contacts analysis is "reaching out" from the
defendant's forum to the plaintiffs forum.1 16 Because jurisdictional
analysis is largely a fact-based analysis, tying contact analysis to place
provides courts a framework under which the defendant's activity can
be evaluated and weighed against other factors in the overall jurisdic-
tional analysis. When electronic contacts through websites are consid-
ered untethered to a physical place, courts are deprived of the
traditional framework for evaluating the defendant's purposeful
availment.
A. Attributes of Place Theory
The place theory of personal jurisdiction is marked by certain at-
tributes that combine the historical roots of territorial jurisdiction
with the appropriate flexibility necessary for the modern commercial
context. First, place theory is rooted in the traditional contacts theory
jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction.1 7 Second, place theory applies
flexibly to almost all situations where personal jurisdiction is raised in
commercial and non-commercial interactions. Third, because it relies
on an established framework for jurisdictional analysis, place theory is
able to uniquely respond to the new realities of interaction between
remote parties through the Internet.
The first attribute of place theory is its basis in established juris-
prudence. 1 8 The theory recognizes that the entire concept of in per-
sonam jurisdiction rests on the concept of territorialism: the idea that
a forum has a duty to protect its citizens from harm and thus a fo-
rum's reach extends to its borders.1 19 This core concept has evolved
into a test based on contacts with the forum.120 A forum's reach has
extended with the development of the contacts test.121 As courts ex-
panded contacts to include more remote interaction, courts shifted
the focus to whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
115. For a discussion of place theory, see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of contacts analysis, see supra Part I.A.
117. For a discussion of place theory, see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
118. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
119. See id. at 730.
120. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
121. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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benefits and protections of the forum. 122 Thus, courts created the
place theory framework for personal jurisdiction analysis around the
coalescing concepts of presence, contacts, and purposeful availment.
The second attribute of place theory is the necessary flexibility it
provides. The issue of purposeful availment has been measured in the
modern context of remote communications, such as facsimile trans-
missions, telephone calls, mail order business, and other devices of
commercial communication that allow parties to develop contacts
without travel to the forum. 123 When the framework relies on pur-
poseful contacts to assess jurisdiction, it is able to adapt with
technology.
The Internet is the most significant communication change in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Just as the fax re-
placed mail, and mail order replaced traveling salespersons, elec-
tronic mail now makes all other forms of communication dated.
Internet commerce offers conveniences other sales approaches can-
not offer. However, the underlying act between the parties in an elec-
tronic communication and an Internet sale is the same. Thus, the
third attribute of place theory is its ability to respond to remote par-
ties. In all types of communication, one party reaches out to the other.
Reaching out is the measure of purposeful availment. If a defendant's
telephone contacts to the forum state can demonstrate purposeful
availment, so can his electronic mail. If a defendant company pur-
posefully avails itself to the forum when it mails a catalog and order
form, then a defendant company purposefully avails itself of the fo-
rum when it makes Internet sales to customers within the forum. The
devices for sales and communications have become more complicated
but the behavioral analysis remains the same. Whether a court finds
itself analyzing telephone calls or electronic mail transmissions, it
should analyze the defendant's pattern of commercial behavior to de-
termine if the defendant purposefully engages in commerce within
the forum.
The Zippo scale's fallacy is its attempt to recast the place theory
framework in the context of the Internet. The sliding scale has been
erroneously adopted as a new framework for analyzing situations
122. Several courts use purposeful availment in the analysis, including: Asahi Metal In-
dus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). For a discussion of these cases, see supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
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where the parties deal through the Internet. At most, the scale has
defined a way to measure purposeful availment through websites by
determining whether the site in question is passive or interactive. An
interactive site occupies the most purposeful end of the scale, creating
a presumption that interactive websites subject the site operators to
personal jurisdiction in any forum the site accesses. However, a place-
based analysis of Internet activity without consideration of the sliding
scale yields the same result. The quantity and quality of the contacts
demonstrates purposeful availment. Likewise, the passive end of the
scale is equally superfluous because passive websites indicate low con-
tact and little effort to reach out to a forum. In cases where the level
of commercial activity falls somewhere between passive and active, the
decision of using either place theory analysis or the Zippo sliding scale
is determined by jurisdiction. To the extent that the scale is used to
identify cases which fall into this more complex area, it can be helpful.
After the type of case has been determined, however, the scale itself
offers no framework for resolving the jurisdictional questions gener-
ated by activity falling in the middle portion of the scale.
B. Place Theory Exemplified in the Modem Context
The Zippo scale's absence of an analytical framework causes
courts to struggle with the scale's application. Consider the following
hypothetical involving conduct through a website.
MedicOne, 124 a Tennessee corporation, markets and distributes
automated external defibrillators ("AEDs"). MedicOne offers pro-
grams and support services to AED purchasers and users through a
website. MedicOne manages its online support services with a patent-
pending "three-prong readiness" web-based interface system devel-
oped by MedicOne called the "AED Manager." The AED Manager
checks the status of participating AEDs and sends automated "action
item" e-mails to customers suggesting customers have their AED units
tested for readiness. MedicOne operates a website that lists general
information about the company, including contact information and a
description of its services. The MedicOne website contains an access
point to the AED Manager, which users may access only after entering
a correct login name and password.
124. The hypothetical case summarized here is based on Premedics v. Zoll No. 3:06-
0716, 2007 WL 3012968 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 9, 2007). Premedics involved allegations against a
rival company based on the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's intellectual property. Id. at
*1-2. The district court rejected the defendant's Zippo-based argument that it was not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction. Id. at *5.
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In July 2002, MedicOne and CALL Medical Corporation
("CALL"), a Massachusetts-based company that manufactures and
markets AEDs, entered into a contract where MedicOne agreed to
provide certain CALL customers with support services, including the
AED Manager. In 2004, CALL took steps to reverse engineer and copy
the AED Manager, ultimately creating and advertising its own web-
based interactive database application. According to MedicOne,
CALL engaged ProM Management ("ProM") to reproduce the
MedicOne web-based support system.
ProM accessed MedicOne's website and navigated onto the AED
Manager portion of the website. ProM created an unauthorized test
account for the AED Manager, an account that is only distributed to
MedicOne's own web developers. As a result of establishing a test ac-
count, CALL and ProM were able to receive the automated "action
item" e-mails from the MedicOne system, which is a proprietary com-
ponent of MedicOne's system. MedicOne contends that by improp-
erly logging into the AED Manager using an unauthorized test
account and receiving the automated e-mails, ProM and CALL were
able to determine the functionality of the AED Manager for the pur-
pose of reproducing it. On September 8, 2004, ProM's website pub-
lished a statement that it had developed an interactive database
application on behalf of CALL, called "CALL MD." CALL made a sim-
ilar publication on its website in October 2004, advertising its CALL
MD program.
MedicOne filed a suit in a Tennessee court, alleging numerous
claims against ProM and CALL, including conspiracy, misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, con-
version, violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
CALL argues that the Tennessee court lacks personal jurisdiction
over it because CALL lacks present connection with the State of Ten-
nessee. CALL has no offices, agents, or contacts in Tennessee and has
never conducted or solicited business in Tennessee. CALL further ar-
gues that the alleged activities were all conducted by ProM in Louisi-
ana. MedicOne argues that CALL's website is accessible in Tennessee
and has been accessed by Tennessee residents, thus supporting the
Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over CALL.
Courts are tempted to apply the Zippo sliding scale in determin-
ing a defendant's purposeful availment to the forum when a defen-
dant's website is the basis for the forum's personal jurisdiction over a
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defendant.1 25 However, the sliding scale provides misdirection in
cases where the Internet activity involves purposeful behavior.126 For
example, if the court utilizes the sliding scale analysis and looks to the
number of hits on CALL's website from Tennessee residents and the
amount of revenue received from sales in Tennessee, the court may
completely overlook the fact that CALL intentionally accessed
MedicOne's website for the purpose of reverse engineering
MedicOne's web-based product. 127
The facts of the hypothetical case parallel a pre-Internet scenario
where one vendor travels to another state to buy a competitor's prod-
uct, then takes the product back to its own shop for use as a model to
create a rival product. In the pre-Internet scenario, the acts of travel-
ing to another state and purchasing a product for an improper pur-
pose would be sufficient to demonstrate purposeful availment. The
fact that modern actors use the Internet as a means for the same end
should not alter the analysis.
If the court places CALL's website on the Zippo sliding scale, the
case result may be highly illogical. It is possible that when placed on
the sliding scale, the CALL website would fail to meet the necessary
level of interactivity to establish personal jurisdiction over CALL in
Tennessee. 128 A misdirected focus on the defendant's website can
overtake the heart of the plaintiff's allegations, the defendant's pur-
poseful act. When the same facts are analyzed through the place the-
ory framework, the court would first determine the defendant's
125. See id. at *4 ("Undoubtedly, the determination of purposeful availment becomes
more challenging when applied to situations involving the use of the [I]nternet. The prev-
alence and scope of the [I] nternet allows individuals to communicate, conduct business, or
casually browse across state lines and international borders without leaving their desk. In-
formation once part and parcel to transactions, such as knowledge of another party's physi-
cal location, is no longer a prerequisite to communication. Federal courts have applied a
specific analysis in determining whether a defendant's [I]nternet activity constitutes pur-
poseful availment, commonly referred to as the 'Zippo sliding scale.'" (quoting Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997))).
126. See id. ("[T]he sliding scale approach is not applicable in every case merely be-
cause facts touch on [I]nternet activity. Rather, the [Zippo] analysis is appropriately applied
in personal jurisdiction inquiries where the facts center on the defendant's activities con-
ducted through its own website.").
127. See id. ("Defendants' activities on their own website are irrelevant for purposes of
determining personal jurisdiction. Instead, the issue at hand focuses on the unauthorized
actions taken by the Defendants against Plaintiffs website. In short, this is a case involving
computer hacking, and therefore, personal jurisdiction turns on the tortious injury that
Defendants allegedly inflicted upon Premedics.").
128. In fact, it is possible that if the defendant is aware of the sliding scale prior to
designing the website, he can design a website that meets the description of a passive web-
site on the sliding scale.
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contacts with the forum state, then determine whether those contacts
demonstrate purposeful availment. In this hypothetical, the contacts
include CALL's entry into a contract with MedicOne, a Tennessee
company, CALL's access of MedicOne's website, CALL's receipt of e-
mails from MedicOne's site, and any and all other interactions with
MedicOne. These contacts demonstrate purposeful availment since
CALL's contact with the MedicOne website, on its own and through
its agent ProM, were undertaken for the purpose of reverse engineer-
ing the MedicOne technology. Under the place theory framework,
CALL's actions should be analyzed as the electronic version of a prod-
uct purchase for the same improper motive. 129 The place theory
framework supports the logical conclusion that CALL would be sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee; however, the sliding scale
analysis may reach the opposite result by focusing on CALL's website
rather than its actions.
Conclusion
All things new do not require new things. The Zippo sliding scale
offers the most compelling example of why functional doctrine
should not be supplanted to address the societal changes brought
forth through technology. The scale is a naive device because it cate-
gorizes Internet sites on a linear continuum to asses whether the at-
tributes of a website constitute conduct directed at the forum. Despite
invocation of the scale by courts and litigants as a device for analyzing
the forum's constitutional reach, the scale itself offers no framework
for evaluating purposeful activity within the forum. In contrast, place
theory allows courts and litigants to analyze an Internet-based contacts
case through the vertical Constitutional framework defined and re-
fined through over one hundred years of precedent.
The Zippo sliding scale's addition to the house of personal juris-
diction is dated. The house suffers under the structural stress of the
scale. Courts should abandon the Zippo sliding scale and return to the
place theory analytical framework. This will prepare litigants with the
inevitable technological changes on the global horizon.
129. See Premedics, 2007 WL 3012968, at *4-6. The Premedics court applied the effects
test, focusing on the tortious injury the defendant allegedly inflicted on the plaintiff. Id.
The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
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